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INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts v. EPA 1 decision, which opened the
door to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)
greenhouse gas 2 (“GHG”) emissions regulation under the
Clean Air Act 3 (“CAA”), was one of the first significant steps
in the United States toward recognizing the effects of climate
change. Although the EPA has made some progress toward
reducing GHG emissions, 4 the anticipated consequences of
climate change, including “drought, increasingly severe
weather events, and rising sea levels,” 5 provide strong
incentives for states to supplement the EPA’s efforts.
Climate change will have a tangible, economic impact,
including damage from increased storms, erosion and
flooding, 6 as well as decreased water supplies and crop
yields. 7 Such effects are seemingly consistent with the EPA’s
determination that climate change endangers “public
welfare,” as defined in the CAA. 8 Upon considering the CAA’s
corresponding constraints, however, the necessity of state
action in tangent with federal regulation to substantially
mitigate GHG emissions becomes apparent. 9

1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that greenhouse
gases qualified as an “air pollutant” for purposes of the Clean Air Act and that
the EPA was therefore required to determine whether emissions should be
regulated or clarify their reason for refusing to do so).
2. The term “greenhouse gases” generally includes carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases. Overview of Greenhouse Gases,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html (last updated Apr.
15, 2014).
3. Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. Coal for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), rev’d in part, sub nom. Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (“UARG”),
No. 12–1146, 2014 WL 2807314, at *1 (U.S. June 23, 2014).
6. Climate Impacts on Coastal Areas, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/coasts.html (last updated
August 28, 2014).
7. Climate Impacts on Agriculture and Food Supply, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impactsadaptation/agriculture.html (last updated August 28, 2014).
8. See Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2012) (“[E]ffects on
welfare include[], but [are] not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops,
vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and
climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation,
as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and wellbeing . . . .”).
9. See infra Part II.C.
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Despite the differing global warming consequences facing
states, the CAA does not expand states’ power to
independently mitigate climate change. While states retain
some ability to regulate in a manner consistent with the
EPA’s regulations, doing so can subject them to litigation and
a competitive disadvantage. 10 Although developments in
renewable power have made states less dependent on fossil
fuels, which are primary sources of carbon dioxide, relying
exclusively on renewable energy is unworkable in light of
technological, infrastructure, and economic limitations. 11
While emissions reductions can be achieved at state and local
levels, 12 the effects will likely be too piecemeal to sustain the
progress necessary to avoid unsustainable temperature rise. 13
Obtaining substantial reductions in national GHG emissions
requires a system that provides additional support to statelevel GHG reduction policies and prevents other states from
undermining those reductions. As the federal government is
unlikely to pass legislation creating a national cap and trade
system, a multijurisdictional program administered by states
is necessary to produce change substantial enough to
effectively reduce national exacerbation of climate change.
This Comment first examines the basis for GHG
emissions reduction regulation and the contemporary federal

10. See infra Part II.D.
11. See Rebecca Smith, California Girds for Electricity Woes, WALL ST. J.L.
(Feb.
26,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323699704578328581251
122150 (noting that while states are investing in renewable energy sources to
meet their growing needs for electricity, the unreliable nature of some of these
sources will likely require coal-fueled power plants, which will likely bear the
brunt of GHG regulation, to continue operating).
12. For example, significant reductions in Los Angeles’s emissions (51.6
million metric tons of CO2 in 2004), City Carbon Index: Los Angeles, GLOBAL
GREEN USA, http://www.globalgreen.org/articles/global/67 (last visited June 21,
2014), could produce a substantial overall impact, as its climate footprint
exceeds Norway’s (50.94 million metric tons of CO2 in 2004), See City Carbon
Index:
Los
Angeles,
GLOBAL
GREEN
USA,
http://www.globalgreen.org/articles/global/67 (last visited June 21, 2014);
Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE,
http://cait2.wri.org/wri/ (last visited June 21, 2014).
13. See OTTMAR EDENHOFER ET AL., IPCC, 2014: SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 9 (2014) (“Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions
beyond those in place today, emissions growth is expected to persist driven by
growth in global population and economic activities. Baseline scenarios, those
without additional mitigation, result in global mean surface temperature
increases in 2100 from 3.7 to 4.8°C compared to pre-industrial levels . . . .”).

218

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 55

and state regulatory schemes. 14 Those programs have not
effectively reduced domestic GHG emissions for numerous
reasons, including partisanship, 15 suits against the EPA, 16
limitations on both EPA and state authority to regulate GHG
emissions under the CAA, 17 and separation of powers
concerns. 18 A state-lead multilateral cap and trade program
including states with the highest GHG emissions would be a
feasible solution to these issues because the EPA’s policies
are aligned with such a program; 19 regional cap and trade
programs are already in use and capable of linkage; 20 and the
incentives of such a program could persuade other states to
join. 21
I.

BACKGROUND: COOPERATIVE FEDERALIST GHG
REGULATION

A. EPA GHG Emissions Regulation
The CAA requires the EPA to regulate the emission of air
pollutants that are reasonably anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare. 22 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held
that greenhouse gases met the Clean Air Act’s air pollutants
definition, requiring the EPA to either determine whether
GHGs posed a risk to public health or welfare, or provide a
legitimate reason for refusing to reach such findings. 23 The
EPA subsequently issued a finding that GHGs, 24 by changing
the Earth’s climate, endangered public welfare and
announced the “Tailpipe Rule,” confirming that vehicle GHG
This chain of events
emissions would be regulated. 25

14. See infra Part I.A–B.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.C–D.1.
18. See infra Part II.D.2–3.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. See infra Part III.C.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)(1998).
23. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–35.
24. The GHG compounds listed as air pollutants included a combination of
“well mixed” gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride. Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air
Act,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/petitions/decision.html
(dated July 29, 2010).
25. Id.
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heralded the beginning of the EPA’s efforts to regulate GHG
emissions from stationary sources.
By interpreting air pollutant regulation pursuant to an
endangerment finding and thereby automatically triggering
the CAA’s Prevention of Serious Deterioration (“PSD”)
provision, 26 the EPA essentially determined that the Tailpipe
Rule required stationary GHG emission sources regulated
under that provision. 27 The PSD requires facilities to obtain a
permit before constructing or modifying a “major emitting
facility”—emitting over 250 tons per year 28 (“tpy”) or 100 tpy29
of regulated air pollutants—depending on the type of facility.
Applying the 100 tpy threshold to GHGs, however, would
cause an enormous increase in the volume of PSD-regulated
sources, 30 requiring permitting authorities to hire an
additional 230,000 full-time staff and incurring exponentially
higher costs. 31 Since literally applying the PSD to GHG
emitters would bring “millions of new sources” within its
scope, the EPA increased the PSD threshold to 100,000 tpy
for construction and 75,000 tpy for modification of a major
This decision, the “Tailoring Rule,”
emitting source. 32
substantially reduced the scope of major GHG-emitting
sources, thereby making regulation of the remaining sources
under the PSD more feasible. 33 The U.S. Supreme Court
subsequently determined in Utilities Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA that the Tailoring Rule exceeded the EPA’s authority,

26. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs (“Timing Rule”), 75
Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010).
27. Id. at 17,019.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012).
29. Id.
30. Coalition, 684 F.3d at 144 (stating that “if the Title V 100 tpy threshold
applied immediately to greenhouse gases, sources needing operating permits
would jump from 14,700 per year to 6.1 million per year.”).
31. Id. The program would “face over $21 billion in additional permitting
costs each year due to [greenhouse gases], compared to the current program cost
of $62 million each year.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Prevention of
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule (“Tailoring
Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,563 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
52, 70, and 71)).
32. Zeroing in on EPA Authority over Stationary Sources, LAW 360, (Oct. 28,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/483582/zeroing-in-on-epa-authority-overstationary-sources.
33. Coalition, 684 F.3d at 116. The Tailoring Rule requires PSD permits
only for sources emitting “over 100/250 tpy of actual pollutants, in addition to
exceeding the 75,000/100,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent.” Id.
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but preserved the EPA’s ability to regulate GHG emissions
from would-be major emitters of other pollutants regulated
under the PSD. 34
B. State GHG Emissions Regulation
1. Combining Comprehensive Regulation with Cap and
Trade
Some states are already attempting to substantially
reduce GHG emissions by combining traditional regulation
with market-driven programs. For example, California’s
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (“AB 32”) required the
California Air Resource Board (“CARB”) to attain a specific
emissions-reduction target through various measures,
including development of “early action” GHG emissions
reduction measures and a “scoping plan” to identify the most
feasible and cost-effective mechanisms to reduce GHG
emissions. 35 By mandating that the issues of duplicative
efforts and conflict with similar programs be taken into
account before implementing regulations, the scoping plan
helps focus regulatory efforts on achieving genuinely new
AB 32 ensures that regulatory
emissions reductions. 36
development continues by requiring CARB to “update its plan
for achieving the maximum technologically feasible and costeffective reductions of greenhouse gas emissions at least once
every five years.” 37 The Act also grants CARB the power to
enjoin or penalize violations. 38 AB 32’s approach therefore
provides tools for California to pursue its own climate change
mitigation policies.
Pursuing a multi-pronged regulatory approach to
reducing emissions would help states achieve significant
GHG reductions. For instance, California began building a
framework for GHG regulation by starting with emissions
reductions tailored by source. 39 AB 32 also instituted a cap
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. See generally California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, Div. 25.5, Pt. 4 (West 2014).
36. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 38561(a), (c) (West 2014).
37. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 38561(h) (West 2014).
38. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 38580 (West 2014).
39. For example, CARB’s Early Action GHG Reduction Measures created a
low carbon fuel standard and regulated methane emissions from landfills,
hydrofluorocarbon emissions from automobile air conditioning, semiconductor
emissions, sulfur hexafluoride reductions from non-electric and non-
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and trade program, which incorporated the sources of eightyfive percent of California’s GHG emissions. 40 The program
uses a phased approach, applying first to electric utilities and
large industrial facilities and then to fuel producers. 41 In
2011, the ARB set the program cap, or maximum emissions
permitted, at two percent below California’s 2012 emissions
forecast, and required annual reductions in the cap by two
percent in 2014 and three percent between 2015 and 2020. 42
Sources could use U.S. emissions-reducing project offsets for
up to eight percent of their compliance obligation. 43
Annually, included facilities are required to “provide
allowances and offsets for thirty percent of previous year’s
Failing to meet that requirement or
emissions . . . .” 44
missing the deadline incurs a penalty of “four allowances . . .
for every ton of emissions that was not covered in time . . . .” 45
While electric utilities and large industrial facilities both
initially received free allowances, industrial facilities would
later have to pay for their allowances while publicly owned
electric utilities would continue to receive free allowances,
“with value of allowances to benefit ratepayers[.]” 46
It is unclear what effects the policies implemented in
California’s cap and trade program will have on power
consumption. While the free utility allowances lessen the
possibility of price increases burdening the consumer, they
also relieve pressure on the electricity generation sector to
improve production efficiency and reduce consumption. Since
electric power generation and the industrial sector emit
similar amounts of CO2-equivalent (“CO2e”) GHGs, 47
semiconductor applications, GHGs emitting in producing consumer products,
emissions measures for heavy trucks and ships at shore, and tire inflation. See
Early Action Items, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR
RESOURCES BOARD (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccea/ccea.htm; see
also infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the low carbon fuel standard).
40. Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program (“ARB Trading
Program”), CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES
BOARD
(Oct.
20,
2011),
http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011/cap_trade_overview.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Eligible projects were initially limited to “forestry, urban forestry, diary
digesters, and destruction of ozone-depleting substances.” Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. ARB Trading Program, supra note 42.
47. In 2011, electric power emitted 86.6 million tons of CO2e while the
industrial sector emitted approximately 94 million tons. California Greenhouse
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subsidizing allowances appears counter-productive to the goal
of decreasing overall emissions.
However, large price
increases would likely cause consumer dissatisfaction and
possibly provoke political backlash. 48 Instead, California
chose to partially reimburse consumers for increased costs
through a “climate credit” incorporated into their electric
utility bills. 49 Current consumption-friendly U.S. energy
policy makes it unlikely that electricity production and
industrial facilities will be held to equivalent standards in
future cap and trade developments. 50 As the market becomes
more established, the effects of providing free allowances can
be further analyzed to determine whether subsidizing
electricity allowances is ultimately an effective strategy.
California’s cap and trade system has withstood
numerous legal challenges, 51 which in turn helped established
precedent for a more widely-linked system. While states may
achieve substantial GHG emissions reductions by regulating
activity taking place solely within their borders, various
constraints prevent them from improving mitigation efforts
Pursuing a similar regulatory
beyond those borders. 52
approach in tangent with a cap and trade program linked
with other states’ carbon markets, however, provides
additional opportunities to make more substantial reductions.

Gas Emissions for 2000 to 2011–Trends of Emissions and Other Indicators,
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD
(2013).
48. See Jeff Gerth, Regulators Struggle With a Marketplace Created by
Enron,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Nov.
10,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/10/business/regulators-struggle-with-amarketplace-created-byenron.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%222%22%3A
%22RI%3A15%22%7D (discussing the regulatory consequences of Enron’s
alleged manipulation of energy prices).
49. See California Climate Credit – FAQ, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/capandtrade/climatecreditfaq.htm
(last
modified Oct. 1, 2014).
50. See Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy
Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 375 (1990) (noting that U.S. energy policy
focuses on abundant supply and low prices).
51. Graham Noyes, Allison C. Smith & Parissa Ebrahimzadeh, Calif. Cap
and
Trade
Still
Under
Fire,
LAW360
(Dec.
9,
2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/492883/calif-cap-and-trade-still-under-fire
(discussing prior legal challenges).
52. See infra Part III.D.2.
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2. Multilateral Cap and Trade Programs
A national cap and trade program could successfully be
developed based on existing multilateral frameworks, with
certain adjustments based on the successes and failures of
current programs.
Several large companies have
incorporated the cost of complying with cap and trade into
their economic projections, 53 indicating that broad-scale
compliance is possible.
Legislative adoption of a national cap and trade program
is both unlikely and unnecessary, as it could preempt similar
programs at the state level, furthering the potential for
additional legal battles between federal and state entities. 54
Instead, states should form a broad, multilateral cap and
trade program, linking their markets together to provide
market stability and prevent leakage, while retaining the
same flexibility to implement independent GHG reduction
policies.
Nine states in the eastern U.S. participate in the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”)—one of the first
collaborative
domestic
cap
and
trade
programs. 55
Participating states have developed a linked carbon market to
achieve a ten percent reduction below 2009 power sector CO2
emissions by the end of 2018. 56 The budget-trading program
apportions the regional base annual CO2 emissions cap to
each state, allowing the state to “issue CO2 allowances in a
number equivalent to its portion of the regional cap.” 57 The
state’s allocation decision is subject to the requirement that
twenty-five percent be set aside “for a consumer benefit or

53. Coral Davenport, Large Companies Prepared to Pay Price on Carbon,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Dec.
5,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/business/energy-environment/largecompanies-prepared-to-pay-price-on-carbon.html?_r=0.
Those companies
included Microsoft, General Electric, Walt Disney, ConAgra Foods, Wells Fargo,
DuPont, Duke Energy, Google, Delta Air Lines, Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips,
Chevron, BP and Shell. Id.
54. See infra Part III.
55. See Program Design, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,
http://www.rggi.org/design (last visited June 21, 2014). The RGGI currently
includes Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id.
56. RGGI Executive Summary, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 12,
2014).
57. Id.
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strategic energy purpose.” 58 An independent market monitor
makes the program self-regulating. 59
Other U.S. programs could be aligned for linkage with
the RGGI. California’s recent carbon market linkage with
Quebec demonstrates that its cap and trade program was
designed to link with others. 60 While the linkage of only two
markets does not necessarily provide a realistic model of how
a broader linkage would operate, the results of this linkage
will likely determine whether other states decide to join
shared carbon markets. Additionally, the program design for
the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord
(“MRGGRA”), which included six states and the Canadian
province of Manitoba, was completed in 2010, but
“participating states are no longer pursuing it.” 61 Should the
former MRGGRA and Western Climate Initiative
participants 62 decide to link their markets with the existing
California-Quebec and RGGI carbon markets, a substantial
framework would be created for a broad cap and trade
program lead and administered by states and provinces.
Outside the U.S., the European Union’s Emission
Trading Scheme (“ETS”) serves as an additional model cap
58. Memorandum of Understanding § 2(G)(1), REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.rggi.org/design/history/mou (noting that
such a benefit or purpose includes “the use of the allowances to promote energy
efficiency, to directly mitigate electricity ratepayer impacts, to promote
renewable or carbon-neutral energy technologies, to stimulate or reward
investment in the development of innovative carbon emissions abatement
technologies with significant carbon reduction potential, and/or to fund
administration.”).
59. RGGI Executive Summary, supra note 56 (the market monitor
“observe[s] the conduct of the auction qualification process and the conduct of
the auction, and . . . report[s] on whether the auction was conducted in
accordance with the participating states’ regulations and the noticed auction
procedures and whether the auction results represented a competitive
outcome.”).
60. See infra Part III.B.
61. Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climateinitiatives/mggra (last visited June 21, 2014).
62. New Mexico, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Montana and Utah were
also formerly participating but pulled out to join the North America 2050
Initiative, which they claimed gave states more options to reduce emissions. 6
States Pull Out of Western Climate Initiative, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Nov.
22,
2011),
http://www..sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news..display/id/23178.
It
does not appear that the initiative itself involves additional development of cap
and trade markets. See About NA2050, NORTH AMERICA 2050,
http://na2050.org/about/ (last visited June 21, 2014).
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and trade system. The ETS utilizes a scaled allowance
system tailored by industry. 63
For example, the
manufacturing industry received eighty percent of its
allowances for free in 2013, but that figure will face annual
reductions until it reaches its thirty percent floor in 2020. 64
This “phased” approach essentially subsidizes industry
changes, gradually placing a greater burden on the industry
to secure its allowances by auction. 65 However, this approach
initially resulted in low allowance prices during the first
Purchasers may internalize low
phase of the ETS. 66
allowance costs by raising prices without actually reducing
their total emissions.
Combining the California-Quebec and RGGI markets
would provide a strong start to a broader multilateral system,
which could incorporate features from other programs, such
as the ETS. International pacts can also be utilized to
incorporate additional markets by securing foreign states’
symbolic commitment. For example, California, Washington,
and Oregon recently signed a climate change pact with
British Columbia stating their intent to implement cap and
trade programs, strive for zero-emissions vehicles to account
for ten percent of vehicle purchases in 2016, and achieve longterm reductions in GHG emissions. 67 While non-binding in
nature, 68 this pact represents a commitment to multilateral
cooperation. Such commitment is necessary to fill the gap left
by national failures to enact cap and trade programs.
63. The EU Emissions Trading System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2014).
64. Free Allocations Based on Benchmarks, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/index_en.htm (last updated
June 29, 2014).
65. “In 2013 more than 40% of allowances will be auctioned, and this share
will rise progressively each year[.]” The EU Emissions Trading System,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm
(last updated June 29, 2014).
66. Chris Wold, et al., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 411 (2d ed. 2013).
67. Governor Brown Joins Oregon, Washington, British Columbia Leaders to
Combat
Climate
Change,
CA.GOV
(Oct.
29,
2013),
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18284; Paul Rogers, Climate Change Pact Signed
by California, Oregon, Washington and British Columbia, MERCURY NEWS (Oct.
29,
2013),
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_24406734/california-oregonwashington-and-british-columbia-sign-climate.
68. Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy, PACIFIC COAST
COLLABORATIVE
(Oct.
28,
2013),
http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/Documents/Pacific%20Coast%20Climat
e%20Action%20Plan.pdf.
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IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM AND
ANALYSIS: AN UNTENABLE BALANCE

While federal and state governments may reduce GHG
emissions using the tools discussed above, such tools are
unlikely to sufficiently mitigate the effects of climate change.
Given current resistance to federal legislative and regulatory
measures to reduce GHG emissions, as discussed in this
section, states must voluntarily reduce their own emissions.
A state-lead multilateral cap and trade program is the best
way to accomplish this, as other regulatory options to reduce
pollutants are restricted by statutory and constitutional
considerations.
A. Political Deadlock Precludes National Cap and Trade
Political reluctance to enact a national cap and trade
system is likely due to a combination of general
misconceptions about climate change and hesitancy to divert
resources to prevent future, theoretical issues rather than
contemporary, tangible ones. 69 Some politicians, likely either
hesitant to support additional regulation or pandering to
their constituents’ skepticism, have made statements that
oversimplify the issue or conflate weather patterns with
climate shifts. 70 Others emphasize the uncertain nature of
climate change impacts to justify their inaction. 71 Regardless
69. Perhaps this will change due to recent announcements that the effects of
climate change are already being felt. See Justin Gillis, U.S. Climate Has
Already Changed, Study Finds, Citing Heat and Floods, NEW YORK TIMES (May
6,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/science/earth/climate-changereport.html?_r=0. However, political opposition continues after these
announcements, such as Senator Mitch McConnell’s statement that “Even if we
were to enact the kind of national energy regulations the President seems to
want so badly, it would be unlikely to meaningfully impact global emissions
anyway unless other major industrial nations do the same thing.” Kevin Liptak
et. al, Climate Change is Here, Action Needed Now, Says New White House
Report, CNN.COM (May 6, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/06/politics/whitehouse-climate-energy/.
70. For example, Minnesota Representative Collin Peterson’s statement,
“[T]hey’re saying to us, ‘Oh, it’s such a big problem because it’s going to be
warmer than it usually is.’ My farmers are going to say that’s a good thing we’re going to be able to grow more corn.” Allison Winter, ‘Tough’ Negotiator
Peterson Rocks Climate Debate, NEW YORK TIMES (June 17, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/06/17/17greenwire-tough-negotiatorpeterson-rocks-climate-debate-2199.html?pagewanted=all.
71. “[T]here is so much we don’t know about this complex field, which is
made even more difficult by our inability to make predictions and test climate
hypotheses, except with computer simulations that have questionable
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of the causes, efforts to establish a nationwide cap and trade
program have thus far failed 72 and the minimal level of
bipartisan cooperation in the U.S. indicates that this is
unlikely to change in the near future.
B. Challenges to EPA Regulation of GHGs
Litigation attacking the EPA’s regulatory strategy casts
doubt on the efficacy of using the CAA to regulate GHG
emissions.
The Supreme Court recently determined in Utilities Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA 73 that the EPA could not “rewrite”
the CAA by creating the Tailoring Rule, but that the EPA
could regulate GHG emissions from major stationary sources
already subject to regulation under the PSD program.74
Justice Scalia argued that the EPA has traditionally applied
“a narrower, context-appropriate meaning” to the designation
of “air pollutant” than the Tailoring Rule’s interpretation. 75
Although GHGs are air pollutants under the CAA, the
majority opinion notes, the EPA retains discretion to avoid
regulating GHG emission where doing so would require
statutory revision. 76 Therefore, the EPA could interpret the
definition of “air pollutant” in the relevant sections of the
CAA to not include GHG emissions where the program would
otherwise be “unworkable.” 77
assumptions built in.” Rick Santorum, Challenging Science Dogma as with
Evolution, the ‘Consensus’ on Climate Change has become an Ideology,
PHILLY.COM
(Dec.
17,
2009),
http://articles.philly.com/2009-1217/news/25269547_1_data-or-testable-theories-global-warming-sciencescientific-consensus.
72. Matt Negrin, Whatever Happened to Cap and Trade?, ABC NEWS (July
17, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/environment-happened-captrade-global-warming/story?id=16790018.
73. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (“UARG”) 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
74. Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Rejects EPA’s Rewrite of the Clean
Air Act, But Greenhouse Gas Regulation Will Go Forward, THE WASHINGTON
POST
(June
23,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/06/23/scotus-rejects-epas-rewrite-of-the-clean-air-act-butghg-regulation-will-go-forward/.
75. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2439.
76. See id. at 2441 (“Massachusetts [v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)] does not
strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from the class of regulable
air pollutants under other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be
inconsistent with the statutory scheme.”).
77. Id. at 2442 (“[T]here is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s
interpreting ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to
encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly
regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants
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While some justices supported the EPA’s interpretation,
the majority opinion held that the Tailoring Rule was
essentially re-writing the CAA. Although Justice Breyer
argued that the Tailoring Rule was consistent with the
purpose of the 250 tpy threshold because “limit[ing] the PSD
program’s obligations to larger sources while exempting the
many small sources whose emissions are low enough that
imposing burdensome regulatory requirements on them
would be senseless[,]” 78 this reasoning was not accepted by
the majority. Instead, Justice Scalia’s opinion noted that the
EPA had overreached its statutory authority by attempting to
regulate sources that could not reasonably be regulated under
the express terms of the PSD provision. 79
The majority also took issue with the PSD’s requirement
for sources to implement “best available control technology”
(“BACT”). The majority stated that “[t]here is no indication
that the Act elsewhere uses, or that EPA has interpreted,
‘each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter’ to
mean anything other than what it says,” with regard to
BACT. 80 Finally, the Court distinguished requiring BACT for
sources already regulated under the PSD to be permissible
because it would be only a moderate expansion of
regulation. 81 Justice Scalia remarked that the EPA got
“almost everything it wanted in this case,” since the EPA
could continue regulating eighty-three percent of GHGemitting stationary sources (compared to eighty-six
percent). 82
The UARG ruling is unlikely to impact the EPA’s recent
proposed regulations to reduce power plant GHG emissions,

that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their
inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them
unworkable as written.”).
78. Id. at 2453 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2446 (noting that “an agency may not rewrite clear statutory
terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.”).
80. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446.
81. Id. (noting that “[w]e are not talking about extending EPA jurisdiction
over millions of previously unregulated entities, but about moderately
increasing the demands EPA (or a state permitting authority) can make of
entities already subject to its regulation.”).
82. Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Emission Limits on Big Industry, NEW
YORK TIMES (June 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justiceswith-limits-let-epa-curb-power-plantgases.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=LedeSum&module=fi
rst-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0.
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which would be authorized by section 111(d) of the CAA. 83
However, the proposed 111(d) regulations are likely to open
the door to a more active state role in regulating GHG
emissions, including the development of broader multilateral
cap and trade programs. 84
Alternatively, the EPA could designate combined GHGs
as a criteria pollutant within the PSD program, but this
would create other problems. As the Coalition petitioners
noted, the EPA must comply with Section 166 of the CAA to
create National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”)
for criteria pollutants, “including a required study of the
pollutant and a one-year delay before the effective date of
regulations.” 85 However, even if the EPA attempted to
designate some or all GHGs as criteria pollutants, states
could not rely only on the PSD program to whittle down
American GHG emissions.
As the program establishes
national goals rather than tailoring them according to each
region’s capabilities, it does not fully utilize each state’s
resources. Due to the inherent qualities of GHGs, the CAA is
simply not the most effective tool to reduce emissions.
C. Limitations on the EPA’s Authority to Regulate GHGs
The key difference between GHGs and other CAAregulated pollutants exists in the sheer scope of emissions.
The EPA’s adoption of the Tailoring Rule exemplifies the
difficulties of regulating GHGs in a feasible manner under
the CAA. Although Justice Scalia noted in Utilities Air
Regulatory Group that EPA would lose its ability to regulate
only three percent of the sources it intended to, 86 the EPA’s
difficulties in regulating GHG emissions demonstrate that
the CAA was not adopted with climate change in mind.
Furthermore, regulating GHG emissions under the PSD
program is unlikely to advance fast enough to significantly
mitigate climate change. 87 While the EPA can develop its own
implementation plan if a state fails to submit a plan
83. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Upholds Rules Curbing Greenhouse
Gases
from
Power
Plants,
LA
TIMES
(June
23,
2014),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-supreme-court-powerplants-20140610-story.html.
84. See infra Part III.A.
85. Coalition, 684 F.3d at 143.
86. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
87. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2436.
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complying with NAAQS, the EPA must first wait for the
state’s initial submission and assess its compliance with the
promulgated standards. 88 Since the EPA cannot promulgate
standards that only some states could attain, such regulation
fails to realize the potential of states with stronger economies.
More substantial measures would be needed to sufficiently
reduce GHG emissions, and the most significant progress
would likely be accomplished by allowing states to take a
more active, cooperative role in effectuating reductions. A
state-based multilateral cap and trade program would plug
the gaps in the current system by giving states increased
flexibility to pursue emissions reductions on a faster
timescale without adding to the EPA’s burden.
D. Issues Complicating State Efforts to Fill the Void
1. CAA Preemption
The CAA limits state power to independently regulate air
pollutants, which, by the Massachusetts v. EPA definition,
include GHG emissions. 89 The CAA expressly preempts
states from regulating vehicle emissions of air pollutants. 90
The EPA, however, retains the discretion to waive the
statute’s application to California’s vehicle emissions
standards, provided the state standard is “at least as
stringent as the comparable applicable Federal standard.” 91
The EPA may deny a waiver request if it finds that the state’s
determination of equivalency is “arbitrary and capricious,” or
that the state standard is not necessary “to meet compelling
and extraordinary conditions,” or that it conflicts with Title
42, Section 7521(a) of the U.S. Code. 92 The outcome turns on
whether the state action comports with the CAA’s intent as
shown by its “history and text.” 93 The intent behind the
preemption provision has been interpreted “not to hamstring
localities in their fight against air pollution but to prevent the
burden on interstate commerce which would result if, instead

88. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 28 (D.C. Cir.
2012), rev’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
89. See supra note 1.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)–(2) (2012).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2012).
93. Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
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of uniform standards, every state and locality were left free to
impose different standards.” 94 Therefore, states are free to
incorporate vehicle emissions into cap and trade programs,
provided the action does not effectively force vehicle
manufacturers to develop different cars for different markets.
2. Burdening Interstate Commerce
The Dormant Commerce Clause bars state regulatory
action that substantially harms interstate commerce unless
justified by a legitimate state interest that cannot be met by a
less burdensome alternative. 95 “States . . . may not attach
restrictions to exports or imports in order to control commerce
in other States.” 96 However, if a state law regulates “evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest” and
affects interstate commerce only incidentally, it “will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”97
State legislation can affect commerce without violating the
Commerce Clause, provided it does not discriminate against
Regulating some interstate
interstate commerce. 98
commercial activity is not discriminatory per se. 99
The Commerce Clause affords states considerable
regulatory flexibility, even in the context of widely-dispersed
pollutants, such as GHGs. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Corey 100 recently explored the boundary between affecting
interstate commerce and burdening it. There, the plaintiffs
contended that the CAA’s Renewable Fuel Standard 101
(“RFS”) preempted the California Air Resources Board’s
(“CARB”) Low Carbon Fuel Standard 102 (“LCFS”) and violated
the Commerce Clause. 103 The LCFS set an annual limit on
the “carbon intensity” of fuel consumed within California and

94. Id.
95. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
96. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393
(1994).
97. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
98. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978).
99. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) (“The
fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies
does not . . . establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.”).
100. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012).
102. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, §§ 95480–90 (West 2014).
103. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1077.
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allowed fuel producers that exceeded the limit to offset excess
with “credits” purchased from other producers in the manner
Carbon intensity was
of a cap and trade program. 104
measured by “lifecycle analysis,” which factored in “all
aspects of the production, refining, and transportation of a
fuel” to reduce GHGs emitted in its production. 105
The challengers argued that the LCFS discriminated
against ethanol produced out-of-state. 106 Fuels incorporating
ethanol produced out-of-state tended to have higher carbon
intensity since the ethanol was often created in less efficient
facilities that relied on electricity from coal-fueled power
The challengers also argued that the LCFS
plants. 107
disadvantaged crude oil, which did not include ethanol and
therefore could not take advantage of the carbon offset
provided by growing crops used to produce ethanol. 108
Further, CARB’s 2011 provision established that “no crude oil
could be assessed a carbon intensity below the market
average, but newer sources causing higher emissions were
assessed at their individual carbon intensity,” leaving crude
oil producers no alternative to meeting the LCFS except for
“supplying alternative fuels or buying credits from the sellers
of alternative fuels.” 109
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the LCFS
did not facially violate the Commerce Clause or discriminate
in purpose or effect against out-of-state crude oil producers
and remanded the case to the district court “to consider
whether the LCFS’s ethanol provisions discriminate in
purpose or in practical effect.” 110 The court differentiated this
case from cases that found a discriminatory purpose 111 by
concluding that no sufficient basis existed for finding
differential treatment resulting from discrimination. 112 The
104. Id. at 1080.
105. Id. at 1081.
106. Id. at 1086.
107. Id. at 1083.
108. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1084–86.
109. Id. at 1085.
110. Id. at 1078.
111. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality of State of
Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994) (reasoning that discrimination was origin-based
where out-of-state waste was no more harmful or costly than instate waste);
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (holding an Alabama
law as discriminatory for imposing import fees on out-of-state waste where
there was no association between place of origin and risk to Alabama).
112. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1089.
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court determined, therefore, that “if an out-of-state ethanol
pathway does impose higher costs on California by virtue of
its greater GHG emissions, there is a nondiscriminatory
reason for its higher carbon intensity value.” 113
Although the challengers argued that origin was
“inextricably intertwined” with transportation and electricity
sources’ contribution to carbon intensity, the court responded
that “[u]nless and until either the United States Supreme
Court or the Congress forbids it, California is entitled to
proceed on the understanding that global warming is being
induced by rising carbon emissions and attempt to change
that trend.” 114 The court clarified that states cannot regulate
“wholly out-of-state transactions,” but are not barred from
regulating “within their boundaries with the goal of
influencing the out-of-state choices of market participants.” 115
The court also noted that out-of-state producers had
alternatives to reduce their carbon intensity and “the
dormant Commerce Clause does not guarantee that ethanol
producers may compete on the terms they find most
convenient.” 116 The regulation’s specified purpose justified
the LCFS factors. 117 Furthermore, the LCFS factors were not
discriminatory “because they reflect[ed] the reality of
assessing and attempting to limit GHG emissions from
ethanol production.” 118 The court noted that while the LCFS
did have “incidental effects on interstate commerce,” it did
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because “it does
not control conduct wholly outside the state.” 119
Along similar lines, California’s Senate Bill 1368 set an
emissions standard for power contracts and baseload
generation at 1,100 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour—the
emissions rate of a combined-cycle gas turbine power plant. 120

113. Id. at 1089–90.
114. Id. at 1090.
115. Id. at 1103.
116. Id. at 1091–92 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127
(1978)).
117. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1091 (justifying the transportation
factor with the regulation’s specified purpose of measuring real differences in
the harmful effects of ethanol production).
118. Id. at 1093.
119. Id. at 1106.
120. Power
Sector,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/tracking/individual/ca.html
(last
visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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The law seems susceptible to challenges alleging that it
unduly burdens interstate commerce “[s]ince most of the
generation that exceeds that standard is located outside
However, the California Public Utilities
California.” 121
Commission determined that any burden was “incidental and
not clearly excessive in relation to the substantial local
benefits of the [Emissions Performance Standard].” 122
It remains unclear, however, whether future Commerce
Clause challenges to state actions touching on sources in
other states are foreclosed. Refusing to abandon their
Commerce Clause challenge to California’s LCFS, the Rocky
Mountain petitioners requested an en banc hearing, 123 which
the Ninth Circuit denied. 124 Judge Gould’s concurrence
clearly supported the prior determination, affirming that
“California is free to regulate commerce within its borders
even if it has an ancillary goal of influencing the choices of
actors in other states.” 125 In remanding the determination of
whether the LCFS discriminated in purpose or effect against
out-of-state-commerce to the lower court, Judge Gould was
careful to point out that the court had not actually upheld the
LCFS, but rather remanded due to finding that it did not
“facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce,”
remanding to the lower court the determination of whether
the LCFS discriminated in purpose or effect against out-ofstate commerce. 126 Finally, Judge Gould restated that “as
long as there is ‘some reason, apart from their origin, to treat
them differently,’ California may distinguish between
Midwestern, Brazilian, and California ethanols.” 127 The

121. Robert Meltz, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42613, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
EXISTING LAW: A SURVEY OF LEGAL ISSUES PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 78
(2013).
122. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the Commission’s
Procurement Incentive Framework and to Examine the Integration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, 2007 WL
403573 (Cal.P.U.C Jan. 25, 2007).
123. Mica Rosenberg, Case to Watch: California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard
on
Appeal,
REUTERS
LEGAL
(Jan.
6,
2014),
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I526d0c4076c511e38089abd4e0a44763/Vi
ew/FullText.html?transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=%28sc.Defa
ult%29.
124. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 508 (9th
Cir. 2014).
125. Id. at 509.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 510 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
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subsequent petition for certiorari was recently denied. 128
For the moment, states appear confident in pursuing
similar fuel standards, which would help support a
multilateral cap and trade program. For example, the
governors of Washington and Oregon are apparently
contemplating executive orders to implement a LCFS in their
respective states. 129
3. Multilateral Agreement Limitations
Regional climate change programs may run afoul of other
barriers, including the foreign affairs powers granted to the
federal government 130 and the U.S. Constitution’s Compact
Clause, which prohibits states from “enter[ing] into any
agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign
power” without congressional consent. 131 The prohibition
against state involvement in foreign affairs generally applies
only when states “set up their own authorities as mini-statedepartments, with power to oversee and either approve or
disapprove foreign regimes or the negotiation efforts of the
The Commerce Clause
U.S. Executive Branch . . . .” 132
precludes multilateral agreements that “may encroach on or
interfere with” the federal government’s authority. 133
Permissible multilateral agreements, therefore, must not give
states additional power, surrender any state power, or coerce
other states. 134

128. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 34 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (denying
petition for certiorari to Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d
1070 (9th Cir. 2013)).
129. See Carolyn Whetzel, West Coast States, British Columbia Talk Carbon
Collaboration,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(Apr.
1,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-01/west-coast-states-british-columbiatalk-carbon-collaboration.html; Erik Smith, Will Inslee Impose Low Carbon Fuel
Standards by Executive Order? – Issue Looms Over Legislature’s Upcoming
Transportation Debate, WASHINGTON STATE WIRE (Jan. 3, 2014),
http://washingtonstatewire.com/blog/will-inslee-impose-low-carbon-fuelstandards-by-executive-order-issue-looms-over-legislatures-upcomingtransportation-debate/.
130. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“Treaty Clause”); U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 11 (“War Power”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“Army Clause”).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
132. Robert Huffman & Jonathan Weisgall, Climate Change and the States:
Constitutional Issues Arising from State Climate Protection Leadership,
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, 6, 12 (2008).
133. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
134. See generally U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452
(1978) (the Multistate Tax Compact is not invalid and the application of the
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Massachusetts recognized that state power to regulate
GHG emissions may be limited by foreign policy
considerations.
The Court noted that a state “cannot
negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in
some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce
in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted.” 135
In the context of corporate average fuel economy standards’
federal regulation, the court in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep
v. Witherspoon found that state regulation in that area, when
disruptive to foreign policy, is preempted regardless of
waiver. 136 The district court held that challengers of a state
regulation had “stated a claim for preemption of the
regulations based on foreign policy” by showing that the
regulations could undermine “the Executive’s ability to
pursue such agreements.” 137 It is possible, however, that
changes in U.S. foreign policy could moot such matters. 138
Furthermore, since the decision was merely “a preliminary
decision on a motion for judgment on the pleading. . . . Any
statements . . . that go beyond the adequacy of the pleadings
are purely dicta.” 139
It appears that state GHG regulation is now consistent
with U.S. foreign policy. The Green Mountain Chrysler
Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie court recently noted that
the State Department acknowledged the regulation of GHG
emissions as an “important factor in the success of GHG

Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are “directed to the formation of
any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which
may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”).
135. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519. As discussed in this Article, however,
foreign policy considerations have not stopped American states from entering
agreements with the Canadian provinces of Quebec, Manitoba, and British
Columbia.
136. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172–
73 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (concerning an attempt to enjoin CARB’s vehicle GHG
emissions standards).
137. Id. at 1183.
138. See In re Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement Commission’s
Procurement Incentive Framework, Examine the Integration of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards, 2007 WL 1584321, at *7 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n P.U.C. May 24,
2007) (noting that the “EPA’s earlier position regarding foreign policy
preemption is no longer viable” because Massachusetts v. EPA “disapproves the
argument that the President’s foreign policy regarding GHG preempts all
domestic GHG regulation.”).
139. Id.

2015]

COOPERATIVE STATE CAP AND TRADE

237

emission reduction policies.” 140 Further, the EPA recently
stated that it “support[ed] and recognize[d] the success and
necessity of State programs as a vital component in achieving
GHG emissions reductions, particularly those focused on
energy efficiency improvements.” 141 President Obama has
also issued a memorandum reinforcing the principle that
“preemption of State law by executive departments and
agencies should be undertaken only with full consideration of
the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient
legal basis for preemption.” 142 The EPA has also noted that
Executive Order 13132 requires “agencies [to] construe
federal statutes as preempting state law or issue regulations
authorizing preemption only where the statute contains an
express preemption provision, there is clear evidence that
Congress intended to preempt state law, or the exercise of
state authority conflicts with the exercise of federal
authority.” 143 Since the EPA’s proposed regulations pursuant
to section 111(d) of the CAA recognize the legitimacy of
regional cap and trade programs and Congress is unlikely to
develop a comprehensive cap and trade law, stateadministered cap and trade programs linked with foreign
governments do not conflict with the federal foreign affairs
power.
III. PROPOSAL: PROMOTING A LARGE-SCALE MULTILATERAL
CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM
A. The EPA’s Role
Given the EPA’s role in regulating GHG emissions, cap
and trade programs will likely succeed where their goals
align with the EPA’s programs. It is unclear whether the

140. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.
Supp. 2d 295, 397 (D. Vt. 2007) (concerning an attempt to enjoin Vermont
regulations adopting California’s vehicle GHG emissions standards).
141. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,284
(Oct. 30, 2009).
142. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
Subject:
Preemption
(May
20,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Presidential-MemorandumRegarding-Preemption/.
143. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/comments/volume11.html#124/ (last visited June 21, 2014).
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EPA has authority under the CAA to create a cap and trade
program for GHGs. While the EPA has already implemented
a cap and trade program for the gases SO2 and NOx, 144 such
gases are criteria pollutants which are regulated under a
different section of the CAA. 145 Therefore, it appears unlikely
that the EPA has the statutory authority to pursue a similar
program for GHGs. Alternatively, some suggest the EPA
could emphasize the role of interstate cooperation and
multilateral programs in its NAAQs guidance to states. 146
In a similar manner, the EPA recently took a significant
step to encourage states to use cap and trade programs. The
EPA’s proposed section 111(d) regulations 147 will likely
encourage additional linkage between existing cap and trade
programs. These regulations would require the power sector
to increase efficiency, utilize opportunities for lower-emitting
generation, and reduce demand 148 in order to cut its 2005 CO2
emissions-levels by thirty percent by 2030. 149 According to
the EPA, the regulations would produce substantial health
and climate benefits while retaining coal and natural gas as
the primary power plant fuels. 150 The EPA would create
state-specific CO2 reduction goals and states would
independently or cooperatively develop plans to meet such
milestones. 151 Specifically mentioning existing cap and trade
programs as a vehicle through which states could meet their
144. Cap
and
Trade
Programs,
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/captrade/programs.html (last visited June 21, 2014).
145. The EPA’s interpretation that the GHG endangerment finding
automatically triggered the PSD program relies on Section 165 of the CAA,
which is not tied to Section 166’s requirements. See Coalition, 684 F.3d at 143–
44. The EPA’s interpretation that the Tailpipe Rule automatically triggered the
PSD program relies on Section 165 of the CAA, which is not tied to Section 166’s
requirements. Id. at 115, 143.
146. Dallas Burtraw et. al., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DP 13-04, LINKING
BY DEGREES, INCREMENTAL ALIGNMENT OF CAP-AND-TRADE MARKETS 3 (2013),
available
at
http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=2
2167/.
147. See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 117 34,829
(June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Electric NSPS].
148. Id. at 34,852.
149. Id. at 34,832.
150. The EPA anticipates these regulations will produce “net climate and
health benefits of $48 billion to $82 billion,” while “coal and natural gas would
remain the two leading sources of electricity generation in the U.S., with each
providing more than 30 percent of the projected generation.” Id.
151. Id. at 34,833.
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reduction goals, 152 the regulations strengthen the possibility
of broader multijurisdictional programs.
By endorsing
cooperative cap and trade programs as a viable option to
attain reductions, the proposed regulations provide the
impetus for reluctant states to join in a broad, stateadministered cap and trade program.
B. Multilateral Mechanics
Pre-existing cap and trade programs can function as
platforms to build linked cap and trade programs, but
differences between these programs may complicate linkage.
To bridge the gap between existing programs, some have
proposed making incremental changes, or “linking by
degrees.” 153 Such a process would allow states to gradually
align their programs with others before committing to a
linkage, allowing them to continue pursuing reductions and
integrate the most successful attributes of their programs
into the joint program.
The existing California cap and trade program could
function as a framework for a multilateral agreement. The
program, developed with the input of the RGGI architects, 154
has already begun linking with other markets. 155 Although
California and Quebec intentionally designed their programs
with compatibility in mind, 156 the differences between the
markets show that cap and trade programs need not be
perfectly synchronized (although differences may create price
differentials). 157 While the linkage is in its early stages, the
152. Electric NSPS, 79 Fed. Reg. at 117, 34,834.
153. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 1.
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id. at 4 (“California and RGGI already are linking by degrees through
cooperation and sharing of information, mutual learning and borrowing from
each other’s program design.”).
156. California ARB to Link Carbon Market with Quebec, MCGUIRE WOODS
(Apr.
22,
2013),
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/ClientResources/Alerts/2013/4/California-ARB-to-Link-Carbon-Market-withQuebec.aspx.
157. See California Amends Cap and Trade Regulation to Link to Quebec,
EVOLUTION
MARKETS
(May
10,
2012),
http://www.evomarkets.com/desks/carbon_ca/post/5885 (“A key difference
between Quebec and California is the surrender obligations between the two
programs. California entities are required to surrender 30% of the annual
obligation each year leading up to a true up at the end of the compliance period.
This will lead to a drawing down of supply from the market by California
entities over the compliance period. In Quebec, entities have until the end of the
compliance period to surrender their full obligations. Additionally, California’s
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future looks positive: while Quebec’s initial carbon allowance
auction158 had fairly low sales of future allowances, most
future allowances were purchased at the auction following the
official announcement of the linkage. 159
While programs do not need to be exactly aligned to
successfully link, “program elements that are not aligned
could have important distributional or environmental
consequences or generally contradict the founding principles
of one of the constituent programs.” 160 Generally, there are a
few key areas that a broad, multilateral cap and trade
program would have to address.
Preventing participating jurisdictions’ goals from being
undermined requires aligning each program’s market
stringency, offset policies, price floors and ceilings, and
procedures for program changes and de-linkage as closely as
possible. Some have suggested that large discrepancies
between price allowances in participating markets can be
addressed by implementing an “exchange rate” for allowances
purchased in a linked market. 161 Essentially, a state with
higher-priced allowances could make a certain number of
allowances purchased in a lower-priced market equivalent to
one of its own allowances and reevaluate that number
according to a particular schedule or pre-established
formula. 162 To avoid losing the power to choose the sorts of
offsets that could be used in a particular cap and trade
program, states can “impose import quotas, fees, or discount
offset system will retain provisions related to invalidation of offsets, whereby
Quebec’s program will not. This could lead to differentiation of pricing across
Quebec and California offsets in the bilateral markets.”); see also Burtraw,
supra note 146, at 27–31 (discussing that linkage between California and the
RGGI is possible, despite differences in sector focus and emissions caps).
158. Cap and trade programs typically allow carbon allowances to be
purchased on a quarterly basis through government-run auctions. In California,
for example, the state and utility companies within the state may sell
allowances to emit CO2 for the current year or future years. See California Cap
and
Trade
Updates,
ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE
FUND,
http://www.edf.org/california-cap-and-trade-updates (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
Emitters of threshold levels of CO2 may purchase those allowances to meet their
compliance obligations. See id.
159. Gloria Gonzalez, Quebec’s Carbon Market Rebounds After California
Hook
Up,
ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE
(Mar.
10,
2014),
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id
=10242.
160. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 11.
161. Id. at 28.
162. Id.
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rates” on undesirable offsets. 163 However, differing standards
on offsets creates a “free-up effect,” meaning that offsets
prohibited in one jurisdiction would be largely available in
those that permitted them. 164 Therefore, the policy goals of
each party are best effectuated by reaching consensus on
offset
eligibility.
Additionally,
maintaining
investor
confidence in the market requires trigger prices for the floor
and ceiling to coincide. 165 Finally, “[t]he contingencies should
be anticipated by each jurisdiction to provide reassurance to
investors and legislatures.” 166 Participating states could
further counteract the possibility of leakage 167 by enacting
other regulation in tandem, such as California’s previouslydiscussed low carbon fuel standard. 168
C. Convincing States to Sign On
One of the greatest benefits provided by a multilateral
state-based program is that it could yield substantial results
even if only the largest-emitting states participated. In fact,
a program incorporating the top five GHG-emitting states
would address approximately one-third of total U.S.
emissions. 169 Such a program should be fiscally appealing, as
it would produce increased revenue for states without raising
taxes. 170 Additionally, a variety of incentives could be offered
163. Id. at 29.
164. Id. at 28–29.
165. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 29 (“Different trigger prices for the floor
and ceiling will influence allowance flows and prices and there also is a strong
potential for differing floors to erode the environmental integrity of the linked
programs. If they are not aligned, linking could undermine the value of previous
investments and thereby the confidence of investors going forward.”).
166. Id. at 30.
167. “[A]chieving noticeable benefit from reducing emissions requires a
significant undertaking that exceeds the reach of any one program especially in
light of the fundamental free rider characteristic of the climate policy
challenge.” Id. at 2.
168. “[C]ompetitiveness and leakage concerns might be ameliorated via an
independent and parallel program that introduced a price on emissions either
through cap and trade, a tax or some types of regulations.” Id. at 9.
169. Based on 2010 data, the U.S. emitted 5,661.79 MtCO₂
e of GHGs, of
which Texas, California, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois accounted for 1,918.85
MtCO₂
e (over 33.89%). WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, Climate Analysis
Indicators
Tool,
http://cait2.wri.org/wri/US%20State%20GHG%20Emissions?indicator[]=Total%
20GHG%20Emissions%20Excluding%20LUCF&indicator[]=Total%20GHG%20
Emissions%20Including%20LUCF&year[]=2010&chartType=geo (last visited
June 21, 2014).
170. “After six auctions, [California’s cap and trade] program has generated
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to convince states with diverging interests to take part in a
multilateral cap and trade program and link existing
markets.
First, participating states—by giving their businesses an
incentive to adopt clean technology—would be leading the
way in technological development and increasing economic
competitiveness.
Encouraging states to invest in such
technologies and reduce their manufacturing costs would
reduce the price gap between renewable and traditional
energy. 171 Using the market to make renewable technologies
more attractive would ultimately allow the benefits of
renewable energy to be more widespread, 172 creating greater
demand and benefitting states containing industry associated
with such technologies.
Additionally, participation in a widespread program
would signal a more united front and reinforce the image of
strong commitment to further climate change mitigation
efforts. 173 Further, a more uniform system would reduce both
administration and compliance costs. 174 Therefore, business
entities required to participate in cap and trade programs
would likely prefer a more uniform, predictable system to a
patchwork one. 175
Moreover, states with less economic power could benefit
$663 million for the state so far, according to the California Air Resources
Board. [California State Senator] Steinberg’s office projects the permits could
soon bring in $3 billion to $5 billion a year.” Jeremy B. White, Steinberg Plan
Would Dedicate California Cap-and-Trade Dollars to Housing, Transit, THE
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Apr.
14,
2014),
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2014/04/steinberg-proposes-californiacap-and-trade.html.
171. See U.S. Department of Energy, Photovoltaics: Technologies, Cost, and
Performance,
(Feb.
2012),
available
at
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/47927_chapter4.pdf (“[R]educing the
price of [photovoltaic] systems by about 75% by 2020—is projected to make
[them] competitive with conventional sources on a levelized cost of energy
(LCOE) basis.”).
172. See id. (“Achieving this electricity price parity is projected to result in
large-scale U.S. deployment of [photovoltaic] technologies, which would meet
11% of contiguous U.S. electricity demand in 2030 and 19% in 2050 . . . .”).
173. “The incremental alignment of program elements and the prospect of
formal linking contribute a political benefit because they signal progress toward
greater levels of cooperation necessary to achieve significant scale across
jurisdictions.” Burtraw, supra note 146, at 2.
174. Id. at 2–3.
175. “[B]oth formal and incremental linking help reduce the costs for
regulated business by reducing the uncertainty they face in the development of
different trading programs.” Id. at 2.
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from offset projects styled on Clean Development Mechanism
(“CDM”) and REDD+ projects. 176 These states could commit
to a “unilateral” linkage, which functions as an “exporting”
market of allowances that the other market “imports” as
offsets. 177 These projects would provide low-cost offsets while
allowing market forces to help states with smaller economies
gradually adopt cleaner or more efficient technology and
infrastructure or retain more forest land. For example, CDMstyle projects could address domestic improvements, such as
upgrading railroad systems and updating the electric grid to
increase electric power distribution efficiency. Giving states
an incentive to preserve their forests also provides an
alternative to developing those areas. Further, introducing
cheaper allowances provides for mitigation gains at less cost,
ultimately increasing the efficiency of the GHG reductions
achieved. 178 Such projects would change the nature of the
program to be more akin to an infrastructure investment
than a tax, which could in turn increase public support. 179
While states would retain the ability to withdraw from
the agreement—as New Jersey did from the RGGI—
withdraw would not prove fatal to the system. 180 Further, the
previously-discussed benefits provided by a widespread cap
and trade program would likely make continued participation
a logical course of action.
CONCLUSION
A broad, state-administered, multilateral cap and trade

176. REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation), which is intended to fund forest preservation, remains a
controversial policy for various reasons. See Chris Lang, Debate: Should
California Cap and Trade Use Forestry Offsets?, REDD-MONITOR.ORG (May 21,
2013),
http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/05/21/debate-should-california-capand-trade-use-forestry-offsets/.
177. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 5.
178. Id. at 32.
179. In 2009, about fifty percent of Americans supported cap and trade and
eleven percent were “unsure.” Pew Research Center, Cap & Trade: Few Know
What
it
is
but
Half
Support
the
Idea,
(Nov.
10,
2009),
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/cap-trade-few-know-what-it-is-buthalf-support-the-idea/.
180. Burtraw, supra note 146, at 30. The RGGI continues operating despite
New Jersey’s withdrawal. See Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey From
10-State Climate Initiative, NEW YORK TIMES (May 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/nyregion/christie-pulls-nj-from-greenhousegas-coalition.html?_r=0.
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program provides states with the flexibility they need to more
aggressively mitigate climate change without subjecting them
to litigation or worrying about other states undercutting their
efforts. While aligning programs sufficiently to preserve the
efficiency benefits of a cap and trade program requires states
to compromise with each other, such compromises should be
manageable without sacrificing the policies each state seeks
to advance. Existing cap and trade programs provide a
framework for other states to follow, and their success has
established investor confidence that should carry on to a more
widely-linked system. As it is unlikely a cap and trade
program will be implemented on a federal level, states have
the responsibility to join in their own program, preserving a
high level of control over the system while benefitting directly
from the resulting revenue.

